User:Caio79 (Brazil)

The assassination doesn't let republican plotting a way to develop

Notes because I don't know where to put these
https://www.ufsj.edu.br/portal2-repositorio/File/revistaestudosfilosoficos/art10-rev3.pdf Persecution of republicans -> Stablishment and aristocracy has been empowered again -> Some reforms to the status quo starts to appear -> They get ousted and the oligarchic regime is implemented -> Parliament curbs empress

Remember Campos Salles

Rodrigues Alves -> Infraestructure, good economy; Afonso Pena -> Railways, immigration; Hermes -> Army-centric; Brás -> Civil code, factories; Delfim Moreira -> Mad; Epitácio Pessoa -> Anti-drought, army and labor reforms; Bernardes -> Represseive; Washington -> Roads

https://www.econ.puc-rio.br/uploads/adm/trabalhos/files/Henrique_Cadime_Duque_Estrada_Meyer.pdf Industrialization notes. Also, less industrialisation before the 30s because no WW1

https://www.lume.ufrgs.br/bitstream/handle/10183/12462/000627005.pdf;sequence=1 JK notes

https://anovafederacaodip.wordpress.com/2020/12/09/positivismo-gaucho-brasileiro-trabalhismo-brasileiro-e-republica-positiva-uma-historia-resumida-capitulo-ii/ Names

Roberto Campos - PAEG

Whatever
Oligarchy:

Ribeiro de Andrada - Yes. - 165 - Antônio Carlos Ribeiro de Andrada was born in Barbacena on September 5, 1870, son of Antônio Carlos Ribeiro de Andrada and Adelaide Feliciano Duarte de Andrada. His father, also known as the “second Antônio Carlos”, founded the mining branch of the Andrada family when he moved from Santos, where he was born, to Barbacena, for health reasons. In addition to being a lawyer and municipal judge in that city, he was deputy general for Minas Gerais in 1884 and state senator in 1891; His paternal grandfather, Martim Francisco Ribeiro de Andrada, along with brothers José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva and Antônio Carlos Ribeiro de Andrada Machado e Silva, were part of the most prominent family in the process of independence in Brazil and in the early days of the monarchy. Grandsons of the Portuguese José Ribeiro de Andrada, who settled in Santos in 1678, the three brothers were leading figures in the emancipation of Brazil from Portugal. While José Bonifácio, the Patriarch of Independence, organized the ministry of January 1822 and led the pressure along with the future Dom Pedro I for the conquest of independence, and Antônio Carlos, a great orator, was deputy to the Portuguese courts in 1821, constituent in 1823 and a leading figure in the coup d'état that proclaimed the majority of Pedro II, Martim Francisco was Minister of Finance in July 1822, constituent in 1823, deputy general for Minas from 1830 to 1833 and once again Minister of Finance after the majority of Dom Pedro II. From his marriage to his niece Gabriela Frederica Ribeiro de Andrada, daughter of José Bonifácio, in addition to the “second Antônio Carlos”, Martim Francisco Ribeiro de Andrada, general deputy for São Paulo from 1861 to 1868 and from 1878 to 1886, minister of Foreigners in 1866 and Justice from 1866 to 1868 and State Councilor in 1879, and José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, also deputy general for São Paulo from 1861 to 1868 and in 1878, senator in 1878 and Minister of the Navy in 1862 and of the Empire in 1864; Antônio Carlos' mother was the daughter of a large landowner from Minas Gerais, owner of the Borda do Campo farm, founder of the municipality of Santos Dumont, near Barbacena. She was also the sister of José Rodrigues de Lima Duarte, the Viscount of Lima Duarte, senator and Minister of the Navy from 1881 to 1882, and great-grandson of José Aires Gomes, one of the Minas Gerais inconfidentes; Of Antônio Carlos's brothers, José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva also stood out in politics, who was federal deputy for Minas Gerais from 1899 to 1930 and later ambassador of Brazil in Lisbon (1931) and in Buenos Aires (1933-1937); Antônio Carlos did his primary and secondary studies in his hometown, at Colégio Abílio, owned by Abílio César Borges, baron of Macaúbas. In 1887 he enrolled at the Faculty of Law of São Paulo, where he had as a classmate another miner from a traditional family who would project himself in the political life of the country, Afrânio de Melo Franco; In college, he joined the republican cause, founding the Clube Republicano dos Estudantes Mineiros and joining the Clube Republicano Acadêmico. He was also editor of the newspaper Vinte e Um de Abril. He graduated in 1891 and in the same year he moved to Ubá, where he was appointed public prosecutor. From Ubá, he moved to Palma, where he was a municipal judge; In 1894, he settled as a lawyer in Juiz de Fora, the most important city in the Zona da Mata of Minas Gerais, and also the most important one in the vicinity of Barbacena. By competition, he became professor of general history and political economy at the Normal School of Juiz de Fora, also teaching commercial law at the local Academy of Commerce. He entered politics through journalism in 1896, when he became the owner director of the Jornal do Comércio de Juiz de Fora, the only daily newspaper in the state in addition to the official newspaper published in the then capital, Ouro Preto. At that time, he was elected councilor and vice-president of the City Council of Juiz de Fora; In 1899, he married Julieta de Araújo Lima Guimarães, daughter of Domingos Custódio Guimarães, baron of Rio Preto, and great-granddaughter of Pedro de Araújo Lima, marquis of Olinda, constituent in 1823, deputy general, senator, several times minister of the Empire and four times President of the Council of Ministers between 1848 and 1865; Although linked to the interests of the Zona da Mata, Antônio Carlos would become in Minas Gerais politics, according to Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco in the collection Antônio Carlos: o Andrada da República, a representative of the “old mining culture” of the state. More liberal than authoritarian, this culture was opposed to the group linked to the “new economy, agricultural and pioneering coffee in the Zona da Mata”, to which, among others, Artur Bernardes, Raul Soares and Carlos Peixoto belonged; With the election of Francisco Sales to the presidency of Minas Gerais, Antônio Carlos was invited to occupy the state Finance Secretariat, assuming the position when the new government was inaugurated, on September 7, 1902; The main sector of the state economy was coffee, concentrated in the Zona da Mata, followed by livestock, developed in the south of Minas Gerais. Instability characterized the state's finances, since the main source of public revenue was the export tax, based on the production and sale of coffee. Any change in coffee prices on international markets was violently reflected in total tax collections; The policy implemented by Antônio Carlos at the Secretariat of Finance was to drastic containment of public expenditure, to stimulate agricultural production and to redistribute taxation, with the creation of a tax on the value of internal commercial transactions, which prevented further falls in tax collection. In substance, this policy represented continuity in relation to the previous government, of Silviano Brandão, a man linked, like Francisco Sales, to the interests of the South, where coffee was the second source of wealth and not the first, as in the Zona da Mata; But the state of Minas Gerais as a whole was governed by coffee interests – not only local ones, but also those in São Paulo, which commanded the national economy. Still at the Secretariat of Finance, in February 1906, Antônio Carlos participated in the negotiations that led to the signing of the Taubaté Agreement. Signed by the states of São Paulo, Minas Gerais and Rio de Janeiro, this agreement was intended to avoid a serious crisis arising from the overproduction of coffee, which had not been able to be prevented. By buying stocks, the three governments guaranteed producers a minimum price, higher than what would result from the excess supply of the product on the world market; The Taubaté Agreement inaugurated a policy, later adopted by the federal government, of direct intervention in the coffee market. It was the so-called coffee appreciation policy. As John Wirth wrote in the General History of Brazilian Civilization, the government of Minas Gerais had virtually no other option, because coffee growers in the state produced inferior types of coffee at high costs, and would not have survived on the world market without the support of a minimum price. However, “it is evident that the valuation took away the urgency of the efforts to develop new state products”; Also in 1906, Antônio Carlos was also mayor of Belo Horizonte, the state capital since 1898. After Francisco Sales' government ended on September 7 of that year, he returned to Juiz de Fora. In 1907, he was elected state senator and councilor in that city, of whose City Council he was chosen president, also becoming, consequently, executive agent (the equivalent of the current mayor) of the city; His passage to national politics took place in 1911, when he was elected, in the legend of the Republican Party of Minas Gerais, the only party in the state between 1897 and 1930, federal deputy to fill the vacancy opened the year before with the resignation of Artur Bernardes, appointed to the Finance Secretariat of Minas Gerais. In the Chamber of Deputies, he was chosen, shortly after taking office, to join the Finance Committee, the most important at the time, and appointed rapporteur for the revenue budget. Re-elected in January 1912, he prepared the supporting opinions for the revenue budget in 1912, 1913 and 1914. In 1914, with the departure of Venceslau Brás – a politician from the south of Minas Gerais – to the presidency of the Republic, he was appointed leader of the majority in the Chamber of Deputies. of Deputies and chairman of the Finance Committee; Again elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1915, he held the leadership of the majority and presided over the Finance Commission until September 1917, when he was appointed Minister of Finance by Venceslau Brás, replacing João Pandiá Calógeras. This nomination was intended to compensate for the designation of Artur Bernardes to govern Minas Gerais from 1918 to 1922, made by the PRM in 1917, when Antônio Carlos had his candidacy for the state government sponsored, without success, by Wenceslau; Pandiá Calogeras had adopted measures at the Ministry of Finance, in the midst of an economic and financial crisis aggravated by the First World War, to combat the embezzlement of money and the corruption that existed in customs, and to restrict budget waste and ease in the application of funds federations, which earned him the opposition of politicians who had electoral support in their budget. He also increased the consumption tax, reaching the poorest sections of the population. Due to the aggressive campaign launched against his management, but which affected him personally, he resigned; Unable to raise funds abroad, due to the terms of the loan for consolidating the Brazilian external debt (funding loan) negotiated by the government of Hermes da Fonseca, and also because of the war that was developing in Europe, the government of Venceslau Brás turned if in the contingency of making monetary issues to face the government's financial problems and the difficulties of export agriculture, caused by the fall in coffee prices; Upon assuming the Treasury portfolio in September 1917, Antônio Carlos continued to apply the policy that had been in charge of Calogeras, and which also consisted of reducing the deficits in the execution of the federal budget produced by the decline of the main source of revenue, the income tax. import. He carried out reforms improving the inspection of public revenue and approved new regulations regarding consumption and income taxes. He retained the production of gold in the country, through a contract with the mining companies stipulating that the National Treasury would buy everything that was produced. Still in 1917, he allocated 120 thousand contos de réis to the application of the policy of valorizing coffee in São Paulo; He left the Ministry of Finance on November 1, 1918, two weeks before the end of the government of Venceslau Brás, in order to disengage and be re-elected as a federal deputy. On that occasion, he accepted an invitation to be a member of the board of Companhia Sul América de Seguros, becoming one of its directors shortly afterwards; Always elected in the PRM party, Antônio Carlos returned to the Chamber of Deputies in May 1919 and resumed the presidency of the Finance Commission, in which he remained until 1923, acting mainly with the São Paulo deputy Cincinato Braga, later Minister of Finance of Artur Bernardes (1922-1926). Still in 1923, he published Banks issued in Brazil, a book that had a lot of repercussions and in which he defended, in the name of classic principles, the reduction of the circulating medium; In 1924, Antônio Carlos returned to occupy the leadership of the majority in the Chamber of Deputies, being responsible for defending the authoritarian and repressive policy of President Bernardes, dealing with the widespread and persistent discontent of public opinion and with the armed lieutenant movements. Designating one of his rivals in the PRM to this post, who had already occupied the leadership of the Minas Gerais bench by imposition of Raul Soares (president of the state from 1922 to 1924), Bernardes strengthened himself in the federal arena, as he opposed to his opponents the union of politics mining; It fell to Antônio Carlos, in mid-1925, to submit to the president of São Paulo, Carlos de Campos, and through him to the Paulista Republican Party, the name chosen by Bernardes and the PRM to be the next president of the Republic: Washington Luís. This choice had actually already been defined in 1921, when the São Paulo and Minas Gerais oligarchies examined the succession of Epitácio Pessoa (1919-1922) and chose the name of Bernardes, establishing a tacit agreement in the sense that his successor would be, in the four-year period 1926-1930, the then president of São Paulo, Washington Luís (1920-1924). According to the policy of “coffee with milk” agreements, at that time it was a question of re-establishing the alternation of presidents from the PRP or the PRM, interrupted with the election of Epitácio Pessoa from Paraíba as head of the federal government. On the other hand, this same system included the return of Minas to the Presidency of the Republic, from 1930 onwards, presumably through Antônio Carlos himself; In the same year, 1925, Antônio Carlos was elected to the Senate for his state, and in this House of Congress he was found the articulations for the succession of Fernando de Melo Viana (1924-1926) in the presidency of Minas Gerais. Melo Viana, the successor of the late Raul Soares, was the only important figure in Minas Gerais politics to challenge the candidacy of Washington Luís, issuing declarations of a democratizing nature and, to that extent, criticism of the Bernardes government. But the latter offered him the vice-presidency on the ticket of Washington Luís and thus managed to reincorporate him into the situationist scheme, smoothing out the discrepancies; The counterpart of Melo Viana's rescue was the acceptance, by Bernardes, of Antônio Carlos's candidacy for the governorship of Minas, ratified by the PRM's steering committee – known as the “Tarasca” – in September 1925, a few days after the slate became official. Washington Luis-Melo Viana. This choice completed the unification of the party in that period of defining the names of the future presidents of the country and Minas Gerais; Also in 1925, Antônio Carlos represented Brazil at the Finance Congress, in London, and at the Parliamentary Congress held in Geneva, Switzerland; In March 1926, he was elected to the presidency of Minas, along with Alfredo Sá (vice-president), without running for office. His seat in the Senate would be filled the following year by Artur Bernardes; Taking office on September 7, 1926, Antônio Carlos reached the presidency of his state haloed by the reputation of a skilled and experienced parliamentarian, “the most consecrated political valet, used to living with the opposite, remover of difficulties [...] formulas”, who were said to be able to “take off their socks without taking off their shoes”, according to Dário de Almeida Magalhães in the publication Digesto Econômico. Barbosa Lima Sobrinho would not deny him his notorious “sharp, agile, subtle intelligence”, but he would add, critically: “It reminds of times of decadence, when spirits like that tend to flourish, floating, indecisive, skeptical, refined, amusing themselves with the word in exercises of pure verbal sleight of hand”; The new president of Minas appointed federal deputy Francisco Campos to the Secretariat of the Interior, who would become the most influential of his assistants in the government; for the Finance Secretariat, Gudesteu de Sá Pires, who would leave office in November 1929 to run for the Chamber of Deputies, then being replaced by José Bernardino Alves Júnior; for the Secretariat of Agriculture, Industry, Lands, Transport and Public Works, the veteran federal deputy and leader of the majority Augusto Viana do Castelo, who in November 1926 was appointed Minister of Justice for Washington Luís, being replaced by Djalma Pinheiro Chagas. Finally, for the Secretariat of Security and Public Assistance, which did not exist before and was extinguished when his government ended (to reappear only in 1956), he appointed José Francisco Bias Fortes, replaced in October 1929, in the midst of the campaign for the succession of Washington Luís, by federal deputy Odilon Braga; The government of Antônio Carlos in Minas generally presents a very positive balance, in comparison with other administrations of the period and, above all, with the governments of his predecessors. There are, however, those who judge, like Barbosa Lima Sobrinho, that his achievements were motivated by the desire to project his name nationally with a view to the succession of Washington Luís, and gained prominence, in fact, thanks to a well-assembled publicity scheme; In any case, there was a great contrast, on the political level, between the attitude of Antônio Carlos in Minas Gerais – liberal and tending to bring together the various currents of the PRM – and the performance of the Minas group in the Chamber of Deputies, which, in accordance with the his command (and under the leadership of his brother José Bonifácio), he fully supported the action of the President of the Republic, until the outbreak of the succession crisis, in the second half of 1929. Thus, the Minas Gerais bench – by far the largest, with its 37 deputies – accepted the refusal of amnesty to the revolutionaries of 1922 and 1924, promised by Washington Luís before his inauguration, and defended the approval, in August 1927, of the Aníbal de Toledo project, which gave rise to the so-called Celerada Law, responsible for the restart strict censorship of the press and other forms of curtailing freedom of expression. Antônio Carlos justified this behavior, according to Virgílio de Melo Franco, by the need to avoid pretexts for mistrust or hostility towards the Union government; Still in the course of his government, Antônio Carlos modernized the railroad of Sul de Minas (Rede Sul Mineira) and started the implantation of the railroad of Paracatu. He promoted improvements in the hydromineral resorts of the state, especially in Poços de Caldas. Belo Horizonte, whose urban evolution had been dragging on since the beginning of the century and had accelerated from 1922 onwards, also experienced in its quadrennium, with Cristiano Machado at the head of the city hall, a considerable development spurt; In the economic-financial field, his policy did not offer substantial innovations in relation to what was being done: support for coffee and livestock in the Zona da Mata and the South. The chronic budget difficulties of the state diminished, as the income of the State Treasury increased: in 1928, they had reached 180 thousand contos de réis, against less than half (70 thousand contos de réis) in 1923. of taxation. According to John Wirth, Antônio Carlos was the first governor of Minas Gerais, since the introduction of the land tax in 1901, to “transfer a more significant share of the tax burden to the owners of rural properties”; In 1928, the territorial tax rose to 9.3% of state income (against 5 to 6% previously), to reach 15.8% in 1933, under the following government; Antônio Carlos also did not contract major debts, raising the annual consolidated debt service of the state in 1928 to only 9% of the collected revenue. In fact, at the end of the government, only the debts assumed by Minas would remain to fulfill its part alongside Rio Grande do Sul and Paraíba in the conspiracy that would result in the Revolution of 1930; Following the Washington Luís policy in Minas, Antônio Carlos facilitated the signing of the contract for the Itabira Ore Company, which had been attempted by the North American businessman Percival Farquhar since 1920, when Artur Bernardes, as president of the state, had created insurmountable obstacles for him. But Farquhar's iron ore exploration project would end up having its implementation definitively prevented after the Revolution of 1930, during the government of President Getúlio Vargas; It was in the educational sector that the government of Antônio Carlos had the most notable performance. In September 1927, the University of Minas Gerais (current Federal University of Minas Gerais) was created in Belo Horizonte. The Secretary of the Interior, Francisco Campos, directed, in a pioneering experience in the country, the renovation of all primary and normal education in the state, according to the postulates of the “new school”, which had arrived in Brazil, through educators such as Anísio Teixeira and Fernando de Azevedo, after the First World War; Francisco Campos and a group of psychologists and foreign professors drew up an entire education reform plan, which notably resulted in the creation of the Improvement School, aimed at training and recycling educators along the lines of the “new school”. The number of primary schools tripled between 1926 and 1929, when more than five hundred thousand students (for a population of around six million inhabitants) attended them. In 1928, causing a stir in political circles and gaining the sympathy of the Catholic Church, Antônio Carlos reintroduced religious teaching in public schools; It was also in the political field that his government became notable, with the reform that instituted secret ballots in municipal and state elections. In September 1927, and it was the first time that this had happened in the country's history, this modality of suffrage was introduced in Minas Gerais. Regulated in April 1928, the law was soon applied in three municipal elections and to fill two vacancies, in the Minas Gerais Senate, in the same year; The institution of the secret ballot was in fact implicit in the government platform with which Antônio Carlos presented himself to the Minas Gerais electorate in 1926: “It is essential that we be inspired by the healthy lesson that points to free voting as the only effective means to prevent and overcome, peacefully, even the most serious political crises.” The platform also extolled the autonomy of the legislative and judicial powers, condemning the “usurping tendency of the Executive Power”, which, “intervening, albeit covertly, in the sphere of these other powers […] diminishes and belittles the moral prestige of the regime”; Contemplating opposition rights, Antônio Carlos’ liberal preaching was: “I will maintain, without limitation, the greatest tolerance in the face of contrary opinions, estimating in the healthy opposition the valuable role of an effective collaborator in the action of governments.” The corollary of this thought expressed in 1926, contrary to the ideas and practice that marked the Washington Luís government, would later be summarized in Antônio Carlos’ most famous phrase: “Let us make the revolution before the people make it”; The more he applied this policy in Minas – with the constraints and mentality of the time –, the more Antônio Carlos distanced himself from federal situationism, despite the benign posture of the Minas Gerais group in the Chamber of Deputies; Conflicts between a federal policy based on the defense of São Paulo's coffee interests and the aspirations of dominant groups in other important states increased at the same time. Since the succession of Delfim Moreira (1919) and Epitácio Pessoa (1922) a slow and tortuous but real process of etiolation of the policy of concerted predominance of São Paulo and Minas Gerais, leading to a Rio Grande do Sul South often upset; But what accelerated this process, leading to the definitive split of the oligarchies that dominated the First Republic and the overthrow of the institutional framework of 1891, was, once again, the issue of succession. It was around the choice of Washington Luís's successor that the contradictions between official policy and institutions, on the one hand, and the real situation of society and the economy, on the other, condensed; With his astuteness, Antônio Carlos realized that Washington Luís would not respect the routine of “coffee with milk” agreements. In May 1927, the President of the Republic imposed the name of his leader in the Chamber of Deputies, Júlio Prestes, to run for the PRP for the presidency of São Paulo, which had become vacant with the death of Carlos de Campos and the subsequent resignation of the vice-president. president, Fernando Prestes, father of Júlio Prestes himself. Elected in June, with the passing of old and prestigious names of the PRP (which revealed Washington Luís' obstinacy in promoting him), Júlio Prestes assumed the presidency of São Paulo in July; At the beginning of 1928, there were already strong indications that Washington Luís would focus on the candidacy of his protégé Júlio Prestes, among other reasons, to guarantee the continuity, in the following quadrennium, of the main line of his government, the monetary policy returning to the gold standard and fixing the exchange rate above market indices, favoring exports; Several episodes marked the hostility between the presidents of the Republic and Minas Gerais. It didn't take long for Antônio Carlos to understand that, vetoed by the Catete Palace, his candidacy became practically unfeasible. It would be viable, however, to resist the imposition of Júlio Prestes, with the presentation of a strong opposition candidate; The splits in the dominant state groups had acquired partisan expression with the creation of the São Paulo Democratic Party and the Gaucho Liberating Alliance. These associations used the February 1927 elections in their respective states to denounce the prevailing anti-democratic methods. In September of the same year, the National Democratic Party was created in Rio, a fusion of the São Paulo democrats with the Gaucho liberators, who, in March 1928, transformed the Alliance into the Liberator Party of Rio Grande do Sul; So that the opposition could think about electing a President of the Republic, it was necessary for them to unite with the republican parties of the big states. In Minas, Antônio Carlos, his brother José Bonifácio and deputy Afrânio de Melo Franco, prominent figures in the PRM, understood the problem. In Rio Grande do Sul, João Neves da Fontoura, leader of the Rio-Grandense Republican Party in the Chamber, came to the same conclusion at the beginning of 1929, thus following the thinking of the historical head of the party and former president of the state for many years. , Antônio Augusto Borges de Medeiros; There were, in perspective, major problems to keep the PRM together in this direction. In Rio Grande do Sul, Getúlio Vargas, who had left Washington Luís' Ministry of Finance to assume the presidency of the state in January 1928, practiced a policy of tolerance in the face of strong local liberation opposition, led by Joaquim Francisco de Assis Brasil. It would be up to Minas Gerais situationism to favor the understanding of the traditional gauchos opponents. And this would be all the less difficult as long as a gaucho politician was designated as an opposition candidate. Getúlio Vargas would be that candidate. It was with this vision in mind that Antônio Carlos authorized José Bonifácio and Afrânio de Melo Franco to get in touch with João Neves, the great articulator of the Rio Grande do Sul unit backed by Minas; Washington Luís wanted, contrary to republican practice, that the problem of presidential succession only be introduced into the national political debate from September 1929, six months before the elections, scheduled for March 1, 1930. In June, however, the issue was raised in the National Congress, and the Mine Safety Secretary, José Francisco Bias Fortes, addressed it in a speech at an official ceremony. On the 17th, the negotiations between Minas and Rio Grande do Sul were translated into a secret agreement, signed by Francisco Campos and José Bonifácio, representatives of Antônio Carlos, and João Neves, representative of Vargas and Borges de Medeiros. Under the agreement, which became known as the Hotel Glória Pact, the two states would support the candidacy of a Minas Gerais candidate proposed by Washington Luís, but if the president proposed a candidate from any other state, Minas would reject it and would launch a gaucho name – Borges de Medeiros or Getúlio Vargas. Although a remotely hypothetical candidacy of Antônio Carlos was not ignored, the main meaning of the pact was to repudiate the name of Júlio Prestes; In July, Getúlio Vargas and Antônio Carlos exchanged letters with Washington Luís regarding the issue of succession. Getúlio revealed to an incredulous President of the Republic that he was a candidate, with the support of Minas. On July 30, the PRM executive committee unanimously approved the names of Vargas and João Pessoa, president of Paraíba, to run for president and vice-president of the Republic. In early August, the liberating opposition of Rio Grande do Sul gave them its support, creating the Frente Única Gaúcha. The next step was the creation of the Liberal Alliance, a nationwide opposition coalition. The Liberal Alliance program proposed granting a broad amnesty to all political prisoners, prosecuted and persecuted since July 5, 1922, and also, leading a series of political reforms, the secret ballot. Under the presidency of Antônio Carlos, the Liberal Alliance held its national convention on September 20, 1929, in Rio, ratifying the candidacies of Vargas and João Pessoa; According to Bóris Fausto, “when the Liberal Alliance was established, as a pressure weapon (together with the coffee bourgeoisie) open to all kinds of compromises”, it was unable to counterpose a new economic and social course to the status quo, “besides being timid references to the need for economic diversification”, leaving him only to raise the banner of political reforms; Like Vargas, Antônio Carlos made a point of saying that, once the opposition was victorious, the coffee policy would not be changed. In an interview granted to the Diário Nacional de São Paulo in August 1929, he insisted on this aspect, recalling his own past performance and guaranteeing that Vargas' attitude would coincide "entirely with the guidelines and with the action that the São Paulo mentality, with complete accuracy, has dictated to their leaders”. He rejected the accusations of regionalism directed at Minas and Rio Grande do Sul and clarified that the formation of the Liberal Alliance had as its primary motive “to challenge the President of the Republic's right to use power to, in spite of the free manifestation of political forces, elect his successor”. As João Camilo de Oliveira Torres suggests, “making” his successor was a right that Washington Luís had, not personally, but “as head of national politics”, considering “the position and interests of the electors, that is, the governors of the great states and certain leading figures”. Later, in a telegram to Epitácio Pessoa dated November 1929, Antônio Carlos would define the Liberal Alliance as “a civic movement that advocates for popular sovereignty the free exercise of the right to choose the supreme magistrate of the nation”; Minas Gerais policy did not join the Liberal Alliance campaign. At first, Washington Luís managed to recruit, for the campaign of the official candidate Júlio Prestes, the Minister of Justice, Viana do Castelo, and the director of the Commercial Portfolio of Banco do Brasil, Manuel de Carvalho Brito, linked to state politics. Another problem was the candidacy of the Vice President of the Republic, Melo Viana, to succeed Antônio Carlos. The president of Minas did not want this candidacy, he did not want any candidacy that did not mean the continuity of his policy. On October 18, 1929, a series of PRM executive committee meetings began to examine the problem; Melo Viana's maneuver consisted of vetoing all the suggested names and saying that he would only accept those of Venceslau Brás or Artur Bernardes, because he knew that one would not accept the name of the other. Antônio Carlos, taking advantage of the impasse created by the clash of the three candidacies, put forward as a conciliatory solution the name of the septuagenarian Olegário Maciel, president of the state Senate. For vice president, he proposed the candidacy of Pedro Marques de Almeida, president of the Legislative Assembly and his son-in-law. With Olegário in the presidency of Minas, everyone calculated, the dispute for hegemony in state politics would remain open, since he no longer had the conditions to effectively command the PRM and the administrative machine itself. And if he died during his mandate, a very plausible hypothesis, the beneficiary would be Antônio Carlos, with the ascension of Pedro Marques; The two candidacies proposed by Antônio Carlos were approved in the early hours of October 22 by “Tarasca”. Immediately, Melo Viana, realizing the extent of his defeat, withdrew from the meeting and broke with the party, followed by the vice-president of the state, Alfredo Sá. With five more federal deputies and several state congressmen, they later joined the Conservative Concentration, a movement created in Minas under the presidency of Carvalho Brito to support Júlio Prestes; Another consequence of the split in the PRM was the beginning of the conflict between the Andradas and the Bias Fortes in Barbacena, where from then on the two families began to dispute the hegemony of municipal politics. José Murilo de Carvalho showed, in an article published in the Brazilian Journal of Political Studies, that until then the two families were “allies and very friendly”. José Francisco Bias Fortes, appointed in 1926 by Antônio Carlos to the Security Secretariat under the influence of his brother José Bonifácio, supported Melo Viana's claim to the government of Minas and, when he joined the Conservative Concentration, accompanied him, asking for his resignation from his position on October 28, 1929. After the victory of the 1930 Revolution, the appointment of an Andrada to the mayor's office of Barbacena would exacerbate the conflict, giving it connotations of political and even police violence. With the Estado Novo in 1937, the positions would be reversed, Bias Fortes going to the city hall and passing the Andradas to the status of persecuted oppositionists. After 1945, the fight would take place at the polls, without the violence of before, with the alternation of the Social Democratic Party, of the Bias, and the National Democratic Union, of the Andradas; On the other hand, the consequences of the world economic crisis that erupted in October 1929 on the coffee economy, sharpening its contradictions and, as Bóris Fausto wrote, those of “the institutions that consecrated its predominance”, radicalized the electoral campaign. At the end of the year, repeated conflicts between situationist and opposition parliamentarians had a tragic outcome with the murder, in the Chamber of Deputies, of Pernambuco deputy Manuel Francisco Sousa Filho by his colleague from Rio Grande do Sul Ildefonso Simões Lopes; Popular support for the Liberal Alliance also grew. On January 1, 1930, Getúlio Vargas, accompanied by João Pessoa, read his candidate platform in a large popular demonstration held on the esplanade of Castelo, in Rio de Janeiro. Afterwards, the Liberal Alliance organized caravans that toured the states preaching their program; Violent clashes occurred in Garanhuns, Vitória and Montes Claros. In the latter city, Carvalho Brito had scheduled a Cotton Congress for the 6th of February. When the procession of the Conservative Concentration, headed by Melo Viana, passed in front of the residence of the local alliance leader, João Alves, there was a shootout which resulted in several deaths and injuries, including the vice-president of the Republic himself, trampled in the confusion that ensued. settled down; There was then an exchange of telegrams between the Minister of Justice, Viana do Castelo, and Antônio Carlos, who accused the federal government of, by blocking the Post Office and Telegraphs and the Central Railroad of Brazil, preventing the communication and access of state authorities to Montes Claros. For Antônio Carlos, this would have the purpose of exaggerating the events (according to the first information, Melo Viana would have been hit by several shots in the neck) and to arouse the indignation of public opinion. The inquiry opened by the government of Minas Gerais was accompanied by the Public Prosecutor Luís Galloti; The most important of the conflicts raised in the states by the electoral campaign began in the same month of February. It was the uprising of the city of Princesa, currently Princesa Isabel, under the leadership of local political leader José Pereira Lima, against the government of João Pessoa. As in the Montes Claros episode, the federal government did not provide any support to the state government, making its hostility to the states of Minas and Paraíba clear in the pre-election period; The more he applied this policy in Minas – with the constraints and mentality of the time –, the more Antônio Carlos distanced himself from federal situationism, despite the benign posture of the Minas Gerais group in the Chamber of Deputies; Conflicts between a federal policy based on the defense of São Paulo's coffee interests and the aspirations of dominant groups in other important states increased at the same time. Since the succession of Delfim Moreira (1919) and Epitácio Pessoa (1922) a slow and tortuous but real process of etiolation of the policy of concerted predominance of São Paulo and Minas Gerais, leading to a Rio Grande do Sul South often upset; But what accelerated this process, leading to the definitive split of the oligarchies that dominated the First Republic and the overthrow of the institutional framework of 1891, was, once again, the issue of succession. It was around the choice of Washington Luís's successor that the contradictions between official policy and institutions, on the one hand, and the real situation of society and the economy, on the other, condensed; With his astuteness, Antônio Carlos realized that Washington Luís would not respect the routine of “coffee with milk” agreements. In May 1927, the President of the Republic imposed the name of his leader in the Chamber of Deputies, Júlio Prestes, to run for the PRP for the presidency of São Paulo, which had become vacant with the death of Carlos de Campos and the subsequent resignation of the vice-president. president, Fernando Prestes, father of Júlio Prestes himself. Elected in June, with the passing of old and prestigious names of the PRP (which revealed Washington Luís' obstinacy in promoting him), Júlio Prestes assumed the presidency of São Paulo in July; At the beginning of 1928, there were already strong indications that Washington Luís would focus on the candidacy of his protégé Júlio Prestes, among other reasons, to guarantee the continuity, in the following quadrennium, of the main line of his government, the monetary policy returning to the gold standard and fixing the exchange rate above market indices, favoring exports; Several episodes marked the hostility between the presidents of the Republic and Minas Gerais. It didn't take long for Antônio Carlos to understand that, vetoed by the Catete Palace, his candidacy became practically unfeasible. It would be viable, however, to resist the imposition of Júlio Prestes, with the presentation of a strong opposition candidate; The splits in the dominant state groups had acquired partisan expression with the creation of the São Paulo Democratic Party and the Gaucho Liberating Alliance. These associations used the February 1927 elections in their respective states to denounce the prevailing anti-democratic methods. In September of the same year, the National Democratic Party was created in Rio, a fusion of the São Paulo democrats with the Gaucho liberators, who, in March 1928, transformed the Alliance into the Liberator Party of Rio Grande do Sul; So that the opposition could think about electing a President of the Republic, it was necessary for them to unite with the republican parties of the big states. In Minas, Antônio Carlos, his brother José Bonifácio and deputy Afrânio de Melo Franco, prominent figures in the PRM, understood the problem. In Rio Grande do Sul, João Neves da Fontoura, leader of the Rio-Grandense Republican Party in the Chamber, came to the same conclusion at the beginning of 1929, thus following the thinking of the historical head of the party and former president of the state for many years. , Antônio Augusto Borges de Medeiros; There were, in perspective, major problems to keep the PRM together in this direction. In Rio Grande do Sul, Getúlio Vargas, who had left Washington Luís' Ministry of Finance to assume the presidency of the state in January 1928, practiced a policy of tolerance in the face of strong local liberation opposition, led by Joaquim Francisco de Assis Brasil. It would be up to Minas Gerais situationism to favor the understanding of the traditional gauchos opponents. And this would be all the less difficult as long as a gaucho politician was designated as an opposition candidate. Getúlio Vargas would be that candidate. It was with this vision in mind that Antônio Carlos authorized José Bonifácio and Afrânio de Melo Franco to get in touch with João Neves, the great articulator of the Rio Grande do Sul unit backed by Minas; In July, Getúlio Vargas and Antônio Carlos exchanged letters with Washington Luís regarding the issue of succession. Getúlio revealed to an incredulous President of the Republic that he was a candidate, with the support of Minas. On July 30, the PRM executive committee unanimously approved the names of Vargas and João Pessoa, president of Paraíba, to run for president and vice-president of the Republic. In early August, the liberating opposition of Rio Grande do Sul gave them its support, creating the Frente Única Gaúcha. The next step was the creation of the Liberal Alliance, a nationwide opposition coalition. The Liberal Alliance program proposed granting a broad amnesty to all political prisoners, prosecuted and persecuted since July 5, 1922, and also, leading a series of political reforms, the secret ballot. Under the presidency of Antônio Carlos, the Liberal Alliance held its national convention on September 20, 1929, in Rio, ratifying the candidacies of Vargas and João Pessoa; According to Bóris Fausto, “when the Liberal Alliance was established, as a pressure weapon (together with the coffee bourgeoisie) open to all kinds of compromises”, it was unable to counterpose a new economic and social course to the status quo, “besides being timid references to the need for economic diversification”, leaving him only to raise the banner of political reforms; Like Vargas, Antônio Carlos made a point of saying that, once the opposition was victorious, the coffee policy would not be changed. In an interview granted to the Diário Nacional de São Paulo in August 1929, he insisted on this aspect, recalling his own past performance and guaranteeing that Vargas' attitude would coincide "entirely with the guidelines and with the action that the São Paulo mentality, with complete accuracy, has dictated to their leaders”. He rejected the accusations of regionalism directed at Minas and Rio Grande do Sul and clarified that the formation of the Liberal Alliance had as its primary motive “to challenge the President of the Republic's right to use power to, in spite of the free manifestation of political forces, elect his successor”. As João Camilo de Oliveira Torres suggests, “making” his successor was a right that Washington Luís had, not personally, but “as head of national politics”, considering “the position and interests of the electors, that is, the governors of the great states and certain leading figures”. Later, in a telegram to Epitácio Pessoa dated November 1929, Antônio Carlos would define the Liberal Alliance as “a civic movement that advocates for popular sovereignty the free exercise of the right to choose the supreme magistrate of the nation”; Minas Gerais policy did not join the Liberal Alliance campaign. At first, Washington Luís managed to recruit, for the campaign of the official candidate Júlio Prestes, the Minister of Justice, Viana do Castelo, and the director of the Commercial Portfolio of Banco do Brasil, Manuel de Carvalho Brito, linked to state politics. Another problem was the candidacy of the Vice President of the Republic, Melo Viana, to succeed Antônio Carlos. The president of Minas did not want this candidacy, he did not want any candidacy that did not mean the continuity of his policy. On October 18, 1929, a series of PRM executive committee meetings began to examine the problem; Melo Viana's maneuver consisted of vetoing all the suggested names and saying that he would only accept those of Venceslau Brás or Artur Bernardes, because he knew that one would not accept the name of the other. Antônio Carlos, taking advantage of the impasse created by the clash of the three candidacies, put forward as a conciliatory solution the name of the septuagenarian Olegário Maciel, president of the state Senate. For vice president, he proposed the candidacy of Pedro Marques de Almeida, president of the Legislative Assembly and his son-in-law. With Olegário in the presidency of Minas, everyone calculated, the dispute for hegemony in state politics would remain open, since he no longer had the conditions to effectively command the PRM and the administrative machine itself. And if he died during his mandate, a very plausible hypothesis, the beneficiary would be Antônio Carlos, with the ascension of Pedro Marques; The two candidacies proposed by Antônio Carlos were approved in the early hours of October 22 by “Tarasca”. Immediately, Melo Viana, realizing the extent of his defeat, withdrew from the meeting and broke with the party, followed by the vice-president of the state, Alfredo Sá. With five more federal deputies and several state congressmen, they later joined the Conservative Concentration, a movement created in Minas under the presidency of Carvalho Brito to support Júlio Prestes; Another consequence of the split in the PRM was the beginning of the conflict between the Andradas and the Bias Fortes in Barbacena, where from then on the two families began to dispute the hegemony of municipal politics. José Murilo de Carvalho showed, in an article published in the Brazilian Journal of Political Studies, that until then the two families were “allies and very friendly”. José Francisco Bias Fortes, appointed in 1926 by Antônio Carlos to the Security Secretariat under the influence of his brother José Bonifácio, supported Melo Viana's claim to the government of Minas and, when he joined the Conservative Concentration, accompanied him, asking for his resignation from his position on October 28, 1929. After the victory of the 1930 Revolution, the appointment of an Andrada to the mayor's office of Barbacena would exacerbate the conflict, giving it connotations of political and even police violence. With the Estado Novo in 1937, the positions would be reversed, Bias Fortes going to the city hall and passing the Andradas to the status of persecuted oppositionists. After 1945, the fight would take place at the polls, without the violence of before, with the alternation of the Social Democratic Party, of the Bias, and the National Democratic Union, of the Andradas; On the other hand, the consequences of the world economic crisis that erupted in October 1929 on the coffee economy, sharpening its contradictions and, as Bóris Fausto wrote, those of “the institutions that consecrated its predominance”, radicalized the electoral campaign. At the end of the year, repeated conflicts between situationist and opposition parliamentarians had a tragic outcome with the murder, in the Chamber of Deputies, of Pernambuco deputy Manuel Francisco Sousa Filho by his colleague from Rio Grande do Sul Ildefonso Simões Lopes; Popular support for the Liberal Alliance also grew. On January 1, 1930, Getúlio Vargas, accompanied by João Pessoa, read his candidate platform in a large popular demonstration held on the esplanade of Castelo, in Rio de Janeiro. Afterwards, the Liberal Alliance organized caravans that toured the states preaching their program; Violent clashes occurred in Garanhuns, Vitória and Montes Claros. In the latter city, Carvalho Brito had scheduled a Cotton Congress for the 6th of February. When the procession of the Conservative Concentration, headed by Melo Viana, passed in front of the residence of the local alliance leader, João Alves, there was a shootout which resulted in several deaths and injuries, including the vice-president of the Republic himself, trampled in the confusion that ensued. settled down; There was then an exchange of telegrams between the Minister of Justice, Viana do Castelo, and Antônio Carlos, who accused the federal government of, by blocking the Post Office and Telegraphs and the Central Railroad of Brazil, preventing the communication and access of state authorities to Montes Claros. For Antônio Carlos, this would have the purpose of exaggerating the events (according to the first information, Melo Viana would have been hit by several shots in the neck) and to arouse the indignation of public opinion. The inquiry opened by the government of Minas Gerais was accompanied by the Public Prosecutor Luís Galloti; The most important of the conflicts raised in the states by the electoral campaign began in the same month of February. It was the uprising of the city of Princesa, currently Princesa Isabel, under the leadership of local political leader José Pereira Lima, against the government of João Pessoa. As in the Montes Claros episode, the federal government did not provide any support to the state government, making its hostility to the states of Minas and Paraíba clear in the pre-election period; As the date of the elections approached, the more radical politicians of the Liberal Alliance – such as Afrânio and Virgílio de Melo Franco from Minas Gerais and João Neves, José Antônio Flores da Cunha, João Batista Luzardo and Osvaldo Aranha, Secretary of the Interior of Vargas – were reinforcing their conviction that Washington Luís would prevent the opposition candidates from winning by all means; They thus began to contemplate the possibility of triggering an armed movement against the federal government. Since the end of 1929, revolutionary officers from 1922 and 1924 have been sought after, such as Antônio de Siqueira Campos, Newton Estillac Leal, João Alberto Lins de Barros, Juarez Távora, Leopoldo Néri da Fonseca, Eduardo Gomes and Osvaldo Cordeiro de Farias. The main intermediary between the “tenentes” and the Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul political forces was Virgílio de Melo Franco, who was a state deputy in Minas; This first phase of the conspiratorial movement did not yet imply preparation for armed struggle, with contacts being carried out in parallel with the opposition's electoral propaganda. Deep down, according to Virgílio de Melo Franco, the leaders of the three opposition states “were not at all resolved to appeal to the extreme recourse of the revolution, if not as a last resort […] Mr. Antônio Carlos, above all, had a supreme horror of the idea of revolution”; On March 1, 1930, it was not difficult for Washington Luís – applying the typical methods of the time, which the opposition did not shy away from, where he could – obtain the victory of Júlio Prestes and his running mate, the Bahian Vital Soares, with a large difference in votes on the Liberal Alliance ticket. He took heart, then, from the prospect of an armed movement; On March 19, however, the head of the PRR, Borges de Medeiros, gave an interview acknowledging the victory of Júlio Prestes, considering as positive the fact that he had surpassed Vargas by an indisputable margin, in order to close the matter, and saying that the Rio Grande do Sul should, if invited, cooperate with the victor's future government; At the same time, in Rio, João Batista Luzardo, who was one of the leaders of the PL, contacted Virgílio de Melo Franco to tell him that the political forces in Rio Grande do Sul were willing to adopt the armed path, under the condition that his state was accompanied by Minas and Paraíba. On March 22, the two went to Petrópolis to negotiate with former president Epitácio Pessoa. Epitácio told them that, before pronouncing on the prospect of open rebellion, he preferred to wait for Antônio Carlos to take a stand. Virgílio and Batista Luzardo immediately went to Juiz de Fora, where they met with the president of Minas. Luzardo was authorized to declare to the Gaucho political leaders and Epitácio Pessoa that Antônio Carlos and his state would accept the seditious solution if Rio Grande do Sul adopted it; On their way back to Rio, the two politicians passed through Petrópolis, where Epitácio Pessoa agreed with Antônio Carlos' opinion, pledging to consult João Pessoa, who would have the last word on Paraíba's attitude. Luzardo arrived in Porto Alegre, with the opinions of Antônio Carlos and Epitácio, on March 25, and immediately met with Osvaldo Aranha, João Neves, Flores da Cunha and other political leaders from Rio Grande do Sul involved in the conspiracy. The following day, he was received by Vargas, whom he informed about the contacts made. Back in Rio on the 28th, he reported to Virgílio the result of his trip: Borges de Medeiros had rectified his statements regarding the election of Júlio Prestes, Getúlio had left no doubts as to his willingness to launch the movement, and Osvaldo Aranha was in full conspiratorial activity; At the end of March, Virgílio and Luzardo redid the previous script. Antônio Carlos authorized them to invite Colonel João Xavier de Brito to direct the revolutionary preparations in Minas. As Xavier de Brito was ill, in a desperate state, Captain Néri da Fonseca was invited in his place. They began to wait, in Rio, for the arrival of Luís Aranha, who would come from Rio Grande do Sul with full powers to discuss whether they would commit to enter the revolution; In the March 1 election, voters had also voted for the renewal of the National Congress. The lack of ceremony with which the ruling majority used the process of recognition of those elected in Paraíba and Minas was another factor of indignation against Washington Luís; In Minas, the counting board, linked to Carvalho Brito, installed itself in one of the rooms of the Municipal Council (Câmara de Vereadores) of Belo Horizonte, whose building was surrounded by an army company. Federal personnel in the capital of Minas Gerais were reinforced from then on. Other measures of government hostility were denounced by Antônio Carlos, in addition to what he called “preparation and provocation of conflicts with the organs of state power”: restrictions on telegraph and railway services, belonging to the Union; management of federal authorities and officials with political-electoral purposes, and processes tending to embarrass the economic and financial life of the state; In Paraíba, the investigating board certified all the candidates for federal deputy and the candidate for senator presented by the state opposition, “beheading” the alliance members. In Minas, in a decision ratified on May 20 by the Chamber of Deputies, prompting a new protest by Antônio Carlos, 14 alliance members were “beheaded” in favor of candidates presented by the Conservative Concentration. The Minas bench, set at 37 deputies based on a population known to be overestimated at 7.4 million inhabitants (seven hundred thousand more than the population that would be censused in 1940), was thus “resized”, leaving the alliance members with 23 seats ( the São Paulo and Bahia benches, which came in second, had 22 deputies each). According to John Wirth, “the disaster was aggravated by the loss of all commission presidencies and by the imposition of federal economic sanctions, something that had never been done in Minas until then. Treated like a small state, the miners reluctantly opted for revolution”; The plan for preparing the armed movement had been transmitted in April by Virgílio, Luzardo and Luís Aranha to Epitácio Pessoa, Artur Bernardes and Antônio Carlos. Osvaldo Aranha accelerated the conspiracy, ordering around 16 thousand contos de réis in war material and ammunition in Czechoslovakia. Rio Grande do Sul should participate with half of this sum, with six thousand contos for Minas and two thousand for Paraíba; Antônio Carlos agreed with the proposed scheme and instructed Francisco Campos to accompany Luís Aranha to Rio Grande do Sul, to verify in loco the progress of the preparations. Francisco Campos stayed in Rio Grande do Sul between April 18 and 27, when he returned to Rio de Janeiro. After interviewing Artur Bernardes, he went to Minas with Virgílio de Melo Franco and Captain Néri da Fonseca. The president of Minas authorized the start of material preparation for the movement. The state's military task would consist of distracting the federal troops that were in it and closing the borders themselves, attracting federal troops, who would thus be withdrawn from the southern border of São Paulo. The seditious counted on dominating the federal troops in Rio Grande do Sul and then marching towards the capital of the Republic; On the 27th of May – after the “throttling” of the alliance deputies – Antônio Carlos chaired a meeting of the PRM's executive commission in which Minas' participation in the armed movement was approved by all. On June 19, Vargas launched a manifesto to the nation, denouncing the procedures of the federal government in the electoral process and affirming that “the necessary rectification is not far off, so that we can see Brazilian democracy in the regime that demands the happiness of the country”; In the following days, however, Antônio Carlos began to retreat. In an interview with João Neves and Flores da Cunha, taken to Juiz de Fora by Virgílio de Melo Franco, he declared – according to the latter – that he was with Rio Grande do Sul and would follow his guidance, but “he insinuated that the best thing would be to sign if a solid alliance between the three states for a political campaign, standing the commitment with the revolution, if the federal government intervened in Paraíba”; Days later, Virgílio took him to Belo Horizonte, for a new conversation with Antônio Carlos, Captain Néri da Fonseca and Pedro Ernesto Batista, the main articulator of the movement in the then Federal District. Pedro Ernesto informed that the date of July 16 had been chosen, to be confirmed in due course, for the outbreak of the revolution. The president of Minas was hesitant and criticized what he considered the precipitation of the gauchos revolutionaries, whom he also accused of having marginalized Borges de Medeiros; Virgílio de Melo Franco would later explain that he and his fellow conspirators active in Belo Horizonte had greatly exaggerated, in the eyes of Antônio Carlos, the extent of the movement's preparations, not only in Minas but in other parts of the country, especially in São Paulo. In mid-June, Virgilio being absent from the capital of Minas Gerais, two emissaries from São Paulo arrived from Lieutenant Henrique Holl, the main person responsible for the conspiracy in that state. Taken to Odilon Braga, who had replaced Bias Fortes in the Security Secretariat, they gave him a report that showed that the situation was not as favorable as Antônio Carlos supposed. On the same day, Francisco Campos received by radio – the main means of contact between the conspirators, who exchanged encrypted messages – a communication from Osvaldo Aranha in which he made detailed inquiries about the situation in Minas; Antônio Carlos, also according to Virgílio's account, was deeply unimpressed with what he called the movement's lack of preparation. “In São Paulo, he said, the situation was very different from what we had painted. Furthermore, he added, at that moment, a few days before the projected revolutionary explosion, Osvaldo Aranha still did not know what was going on in Minas. […] He accused us all of involving him, and our state, in a crazy adventure”, showing himself to be “irreducible in his intentions to abort the movement”; On June 17, Antônio Carlos ordered Francisco Campos to send Osvaldo Aranha a radiogram, signed by the Secretary of the Interior, stating that the president of Minas considered the movement to be entirely lacking in articulation, poorly prepared and with no likelihood of success, and proposed a concertation between Minas and Rio Grande do Sul with a view to a political campaign. Osvaldo Aranha responded by urging the government of Minas Gerais to define itself in relation to the armed struggle; On the 21st, Francisco Campos contacted Osvaldo Aranha again, reiterating that Antônio Carlos advocated, as a guideline, an exclusively political action, and concluding with the opinion – which he considered his own, but which had been dictated to him by the president of Minas – that the head of the Minas Gerais government wanted to avoid the movement; Two days later, came Aranha's harsh reply: the president of Minas bore full responsibility for the withdrawal ("My opinion is worse than that of blacks who suffered slavery with less ridicule"). Worried about the repercussions of his attitude, Antônio Carlos sought to transfer the responsibility for whether or not Minas participated to the elected president (in March) of the state, Olegário Maciel. Virgílio de Melo Franco, realizing the maneuver, got Cristiano Machado, responsible for the Interior portfolio in the secretariat chosen by Olegário Maciel, to send him a message suggesting a discouraging response to Antônio Carlos' pretensions; On June 27, after understandings reached with the leadership of the PRM, Virgílio X-rayed Osvaldo Aranha telling him that the situation should not be faced with pessimism, since the president of Minas was isolated in his vacillating position. He also thought that, if Rio Grande do Sul demanded the fulfillment of the commitment assumed, Antônio Carlos himself would not break his word. Osvaldo Aranha replied the following day: “My conviction is that you and I are victims of shameful mystification. I'm fed up with this comedy. Impossible to continue under leadership so weak that it discourages the soldiers themselves. My unshakable disposition to abandon political life.” Meanwhile, Antonio Carlos' retreat gave Getulio the pretext he needed to retreat himself. Osvaldo Aranha resigned from the Secretary of Justice of the Rio Grande do Sul government. The first attempt to start the revolution had failed; Virgílio went to Rio to discuss the situation with João Neves, Lindolfo Collor (federal deputy for the PRR) and Maurício Cardoso, who was on an observation mission, sent by the PRR's steering committee. Virgílio and Maurício Cardoso held a new tour of talks. They were first in Viçosa, where Virgílio obtained a letter from Artur Bernardes addressed to Olegário Maciel: “I see no dignified way out for us except through the door of the revolution – the only one left open by the enemy.” After contacts made in Belo Horizonte, they decided to return to Rio, where Maurício Cardoso would await the arrival of Olegário Maciel, to interview him in the presence of Artur Bernardes and Lindolfo Collor, who had replaced João Neves at the head of the PRR bench; While the most obstinate conspirators struggled to keep the revolutionary plot in place, which was falling apart under the effect of failures and disagreements, João Pessoa was assassinated in Recife on July 26, 1930. The revolutionary perspective was then reinstated. Antônio Carlos proposed to Getúlio that he launch a manifesto to the nation in which Washington Luís would be appointed as the person who ordered the murder and, for this reason, be declared outlawed. Vargas rejected the idea: “A manifesto of this nature, without its immediate and logical succession, would be suicide and a crime”; Virgílio de Melo Franco, who had arrived in Porto Alegre with the news of João Pessoa's murder, tried to inform the leaders of the PRM that the revolution would come, even if Rio Grande do Sul did it without Minas. He resumed negotiations between the two states, despite Antônio Carlos having sent word to Getúlio that he did not represent the thinking of Minas Gerais. At the same time, in Rio, Olegário Maciel declared to Maurício Cardoso that he was in agreement with the movement, as long as it took place under the government of Antônio Carlos, who would hand over the presidency of the state to him on September 7; Osvaldo Aranha scheduled the start of the movement for August 26, but, a few days before, he communicated that there was not enough preparation for it to erupt before the inauguration of Olegário Maciel. In a situation marked by reciprocal distrust between the conspirators of the different states, the news generated great tension; Mário Brant, PRM federal deputy, Djalma Pinheiro Chagas, Secretary of Agriculture for Antônio Carlos, and Pedro Ernesto addressed the gauchos stating that the movement would only be possible until September 7th. Antônio Carlos, in turn, communicated directly with Getúlio to validate the hypothesis of the outbreak of the revolt after that date, saying he was authorized by Olegário Maciel to do so. Finally, on September 25, Vargas and Osvaldo Aranha set the date for the outbreak of the revolution for October 3; The hesitation of Antônio Carlos, at the end of June, causing the postponement of the uprising, ended up being beneficial for its outbreak in Minas, according to the opinion of Virgílio de Melo Franco, because the federal troops that reinforced the Belo Horizonte garrison were withdrawn before the possession of Olegário Maciel, whose adherence to the conspiracy was apparently not taken seriously by Washington Luís, who, moreover, only noticed the evidence of the facts, in general, when they had already occurred and produced their serious consequences; The revolution began in Porto Alegre at 5:30 pm on October 3rd. At 11 pm, all the military garrisons in the capital of Rio Grande do Sul were in control, with the exception of a cavalry battalion, which surrendered the following day. In Belo Horizonte, the fight began at the same moment, but the resistance offered by the 12th Infantry Regiment (12th Infantry Regiment), despite the arrest of its commander, Colonel José Joaquim de Andrade, on the same afternoon of the 3rd, was more tenacious: the regiment resisted the siege and attacks by the rebels (troops of the Public Force) for five days; While Odilon Braga, who had been Secretary of Security until September 7, articulated revolutionary activities in the capital of Minas Gerais, where Olegário Maciel and Artur Bernardes, Antônio Carlos and the other civil and military leaders of the movement, including most of the state government,, moved to the region of Barbacena and Juiz de Fora. The base of operations was moved there after the surrender of the 12th Infantry, on the 8th. The 10th Cavalry Battalion, from Ouro Preto, had already been dominated by the rebel forces based in Barbacena. With the help of the troops liberated in Belo Horizonte by the surrender of the 12th Infantry Regiment, on the 15th the 11th Infantry Regiment of São João del Rei and the Cavalry Regiment of Três Corações were overpowered; On October 24, when the troops departing from Rio Grande do Sul were already on the border between Paraná and São Paulo, Washington Luís was deposed in Rio de Janeiro, and a military government junta assumed the government. The junta's intentions were unclear. Its members declared themselves willing to accept that Vargas, the leader of the revolution, assume the presidency of a government collegiate. But Getúlio's plans did not foresee the sharing of power. He became head of the provisional government on November 3, after the junta caved in the face of the threat of rebel troops continuing their advance towards the federal capital; The victory of the revolution strengthened, in Minas Gerais, the authority of Olegário Maciel – the only state ruler who was not replaced by a federal intervenor – and of the PRM, representative of the local dominant groups. The party's president, Artur Bernardes, had played an important role in the political preparation of the movement, maintaining a firm position, which contrasted with the vacillating conduct of Antônio Carlos and Olegário Maciel himself; The situation however became unstable, because it contained a contradiction between the objectives of the “tenentes” and young radical politicians of the Liberal Alliance, such as Osvaldo Aranha and Virgílio de Melo Franco, and those of the traditional political forces. For them, the revolution had been “an armed movement aimed at reestablishing the political game broken by São Paulo”. The intervention of the “lieutenants” in political life in Minas Gerais “had as its main objective the neutralization of the political power of the oligarchies, finding a target and resistance in the Bernardist faction”, according to the work of Helena Bomeny published in Regionalismo e centralização politica; At the same time, the division had installed itself within the PRM since the process of choosing Olegário Maciel to govern the state, in October 1929, and the subsequent creation of the Conservative Concentration, whose activity had robbed candidate Getúlio Vargas of many votes in Minas in the election. on March 1, 1930. Since taking office in early September, Olegário Maciel had been facing serious difficulties in forming a group within the PRM that could serve as a support base for his government. Bernardes' influence in Minas was great, and it seemed to grow after the triumph of the armed movement; Still in November 1930, the “tenentes” began to pressure Olegário in the sense of establishing an anti-Bernardista alliance. The most important target, however, was not the presence of Bernardes in political life in Minas Gerais, but the PRM itself and its system of power, as expressions of a mentality and practices that the revolution, in the view of the “tenentes”, had come to eradicate. On November 21, Olegário received a telegram signed by several ministers of the provisional government, by the head of police of the Federal District, Batista Luzardo, and by the former head of the General Staff of the Revolutionary Forces, Lieutenant Colonel Pedro Aurélio de Góis Monteiro, suggesting the creation of the Legion of October in Minas, as an instrument of defense and propagation of the ideals of the revolution; At the end of the month, Antônio Carlos refused to be the patron of an “Antonio Carlos Revolutionary Legion”, instructing his co-religionists to fit into the formation process of the October Legion. Days earlier, the Bernardist faction had been hit with the resignation, by Olegário Maciel, of three state secretaries who had tried to convince him to resign: Cristiano Machado (Interior), Alaor Prata (Agriculture) and José Carneiro de Resende (Finance), replaced, respectively, by Gustavo Capanema, Cincinato Noronha Guarani and Amaro Lanar; In early 1931, Antônio Carlos, like Artur Bernardes, declined Vargas's invitation to take up an embassy abroad (his brother José Bonifácio, however, agreed to be named Brazilian ambassador in Lisbon); The Legião de Outubro was founded in Minas on February 27, 1931, by Francisco Campos (Minister of Education and Public Health in the provisional government), Gustavo Capanema and Amaro Lanari, not long in revealing its fascist character. Antônio Carlos joined the movement without much enthusiasm, being elected to its direction. On April 21, Francisco Campos organized a parade at the Legião in Belo Horizonte. The legionnaires, constituting a uniformed militia in “khaki shirts”, flocked from almost every municipality in the state. The organization then changed its name to Legião Liberal Mineira, and managed to recruit a large contingent of Perremists, through pressure and intimidation; In early July, Antônio Carlos stated in an interview that the Legião Mineira program was the fusion of the Liberal Alliance manifesto with the platform of the candidate Getúlio Vargas. According to Helena Bomeny, ambiguity marked Legião from the beginning: “resulting from a lieutenant project, it found itself in the contingency of being implanted by anarchic forces of the state. If ideologically it was characterized by criticism of oligarchic regionalism, in practice it was driven by sectors of the oligarchy”;

Themes:

ABC -

ABL -

AIPB -

AM-B -

AL -

Anarchism -

1891 Constitutional Assembly -

ABE -

ABI -

ACSP -

ACRJ -

AVANTI! -

Brazil Bank -

National Flag -

Imperial Family Ban -

A Batalha -

Workers and peasants bloc -

Bolivia Syndicate -

Salvador bombing -

Borracha -

Bota-Abaixo -

Caixa de aposentadorias e pensões de estradas de ferro -

Campanha Civilista -

False letters -

CACO -

Centro acadêmico XI de agosto -

CIESP -

Centro dom vital -

CIB -

A cigarra -

Clarté -

Classe operária -

Clube de engenharia -

Clube militar -

Clube naval -

Clube republicano -

Código civil de 1916 -

Coligação Católica Brasileira -

Coluna Prestes -

Comissão de diplomação dos eleitos/Comissão de verificação de poderes -

Confederação geral do trabalho -

COB -

Conferencias de Paz de Haia (1899 e 1907) -

Conferencias pan-americanas -

CNT -

1891 Constitution -

Convenio de Taubaté -

Colarinho Roosevelt -

Coronelismo -

Correio da manhã -

Correio do povo -

Correio Paulistano -

1929 Crisis -

Crítica -

O Cruzeiro -

Damas da cruz verde -

Defesa nacional -

DNSP -

Dia do soldado -

Diário carioca -

Diário da Bahia -

Diário da manhã -

Diário da noite -

Diário de notícias (RJ) -

Diário de notícias (salvador) -

Diário de pernambuco -

Diário de SP -

Diário nacional -

Diário oficial -

Diplomacia das canhoneiras -

Dom Quixote -

Doutrina Drago -

Electron -

ELEIÇÃO A BICO DE PENA -

ENCILHAMENTO -

ESCOLA DO RECIFE -

ESCOLA MILITAR DA PRAIA VERMELHA -

ESCOLA MILITAR DO REALENGO -

ESQUERDA, A -

ESTADO DE MINAS -

ESTADO DE S. PAULO, O -

EXPOSIÇÃO DO CENTENÁRIO DA ABERTURA DOS PORTOS -

EXPOSIÇÃO INTERNACIONAL DO CENTENÁRIO DA INDEPENDÊNCIA DO BRASIL -

FEDERAÇÃO, A -

FEDERAÇÃO BRASILEIRA PELO PROGRESSO FEMININO -

FLORIANISMO -

FLUMINENSE, O -

FON FON -

FUNDING LOANS (1898, 1914 e 1931) -

GAZETA, A -

IMIGRAÇÃO -

IMPOSTO DE RENDA -

ITABIRA IRON ORE COMPANY -

IFOCS -

JACOBINISMO -

Silva Jardim (republican stuff) -

JORNAL DO BRASIL -

JORNAL DO COMÉRCIO -

JORNAL, O -

JOVENS TURCOS -

KLAXON -

LANTERNA, A -

LEI DO SORTEIO MILITAR -

LEI ELÓI CHAVES -

LEIS ADOLFO GORDO -

LIGA BRASILEIRA CONTRA O ANALFABETISMO -

LIGA BRASILEIRA PELOS ALIADOS -

LIGA DA DEFESA NACIONAL (LDN) -

LIGA DAS NAÇÕES -

LIGA DE AÇÃO REVOLUCIONARIA -

LIGA NACIONALISTA DE SÃO PAULO (LNSP) -

LIGA PRÓ-SANEAMENTO DO BRASIL -

LIGHT -

MAÇONARIA -

MARAGATOS, PICA-PAUS E CHIMANGOS -

MUTUALISMO -

NAÇÃO, A -

NACIONALISMO -

Nicanor do Nascimento -

NOITE, A -

NOTÍCIA, A -

OCUPAÇÃO BRITÂNICA DA ILHA DA TRINDADE -

OLIGARQUIAS -

ORDEM, A -

PACTO BRIAND-KELLOG -

PACTO DE PEDRAS ALTAS -

PAÍS, O -

PARTICIPAÇÃO BRASILEIRA NA CONFERÊNCIA DE PAZ DE VERSALHES -

PARTICIPAÇÃO BRASILEIRA NA PRIMEIRA GUERRA MUNDIAL -

PÁTRIA, A -

PLATEIA, A -

PLEBE, A -

POLÍTICA COMERCIAL NA PRIMEIRA REPÚBLICA -

POLÍTICA DAS SALVAÇÕES -

POLÍTICA DOS GOVERNADORES -

POSITIVISMO -

POVO, O -

PRIMEIRO CONGRESSO OPERÁRIO BRASILEIRO -

Proclamação da República -

PROJETO DE PACTO DO ABC DE 1909 -

QUESTÃO MILITAR -

QUESTÃO PANTHER -

RAZÃO, A -

REAÇÃO REPUBLICANA -

REARMAMENTO NAVAL (1910) -

RECONHECIMENTO DO REGIME REPUBLICANO -

REFORMA DA CONSTITUIÇÃO DE 1891 -

REFORMA DO SERVIÇO DIPLOMÁTICO (1895) -

REFORMAS EDUCACIONAIS -

RETIRADA DO BRASIL DA LIGA DAS NAÇÕES -

REVISTA DA SEMANA -

REVISTA DE ANTROPOFAGIA -

REVISTA DO BRASIL -

REVISTA ILUSTRADA -

REVOLTA DA ARMADA -

REVOLTA DA CHIBATA -

REVOLTA DA VACINA -

REVOLTA DE 5 DE JULHO DE 1922 -

REVOLTA DE 5 DE JULHO DE 1924 -

REVOLUÇÃO DE 1930 -

REVOLUÇÃO FEDERALISTA -

REVOLUÇÃO GAÚCHA DE 1923 -

SEDIÇÃO DE JUAZEIRO -

SEGUNDO CONGRESSO OPERÁRIO BRASILEIRO -

SEMANA DE ARTE MODERNA -

SINDICALISMO -

SINDICALISMO AMARELO -

SINDICATO -

SISTEMA ELEITORAL -

SAIN -

SRB -

STF -

STM -

TARDE, A -

TENENTISMO -

TERRA LIVRE, A -

TRATADO DE LOCARNO -

TRATADO DE PETRÓPOLIS -

TRATADOS DE FIXAÇÃO DE LIMITES TERRITORIAIS -

TRIBUNAL DE CONTAS -

UFAM -

Characters